Abstract: During the 1850s, the amount of farmland in the United States increased by 40 million hectares (100 million acres), or more than one-third. Moreover, almost 20 million hectares, an area almost equal to that of the states of Indiana and Ohio combined, were converted from their raw, natural state into productive farmland. e time and expense of transforming this land into a productive agricultural resource represented a signi cant fraction of domestic capital formation at the time and was an important contributor to American economic growth. Even more impressive, however, was the fact that almost half of these total net additions to cropland occurred in just seven Midwestern states, which constituted somewhat less than one-eighth of the land area of the country at that time. Using a new GIS-based transportation database linked to county-level census data, we estimate that at least a quarter (and possibly two-thirds or more) of this increase in cultivable land can be linked directly to the coming of the railroad to the Midwest. Farmers responded to the shrinking transportation wedge, which raised agricultural revenue productivity, by rapidly expanding the area under cultivation and these changes, in turn, drove an increase in farm and land values.
Introduction
Growth accounting suggests that capital formation accounted for approximately one-third of the increase in per-capita GNP in the United States between 1800 and 1840, and almost onehalf of the increase between 1840 and 1900 (Engerman et al. 2000b) . While some of this growth in the capital stock came from foreign sources, much was created through domestic savings and investment. According to Engerman et al. (2000b) , for example, the domestic savings rate in the 1850s was between 17 and 20 percent depending on one's assumptions about prices and home manufacturing.
During the same period, a considerable portion of domestic investment took the form of land clearing and associated improvements to make the land suitable for agriculture. While the federal censuses prior to 1850 did not collect information on the amount of land in farms or improved acreage, we  jeremy.atack@vanderbilt.edu  margora@bu.edu do know from other sources that, during the 1840s, the federal government sold off over 19 million acres (7.7 million hectares) of public land despite the bursting of the 1830s speculative land bubble (Carter et al. 2006, Table Cf79 ). Much of this land went (eventually) to farmers and, by 1850, the Census reported over 293 million acres (118 million hectares) of land in farms, of which about 38.5 percent had been improved (United States Census Office and de Bow 1854, Table 183 ).
Public land sales during the 1850s increased more than two-and-a-half fold. is represents an area 80 percent larger than the state of Ohio or 40 percent larger than Illinois (Carter et al. 2006, Table Cf79 ). Although it took time for the new land to be cleared and enter agricultural production, improved acreage grew by almost 20 million hectares during the decade and land in farms expanded by well over 40 million hectares. As a result, by 1860, a little over 40 percent of all land in farms had been improved (United States Census Office and Kennedy 1864, 184) .        . Such additions to the stock of improved farmland may have accounted for more than half of all capital formation before 1820. Even as late as 1860, Engerman et al. (2000b) estimates that 22 percent of annual capital formation came from additions to the stock of improved acreage. However, while the quantitative signi cance of these improvements to farm land has been widely recognized (Engerman et al. 2000a; Primack 1962 Primack , 1977 , the quantitative signi cance of the causal factors underlying such investments is less clear. Using a newly developed dataset, this paper sheds light on one such causal factor: the coming of the railroad, which lowered the costs of internal transportation and thus expanded commerce. In our analysis, we focus on the decade of the 1850s in the American Midwest since it was there that almost half of the increase in improved farmland during the decade occurred and was also where much of the railroad construction took place, especially between 1853 and 1856. Indeed, in 1856, almost 40 percent of the nation's new railroad construction occurred in a single Midwestern state, Illinois. Our new data consist of countylevel information on the spread of the railroad network in seven Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin) during the 1850s, which has been linked to existing county-level data on farm outcomes at the benchmark census dates. e transportation data, collected as part of a larger project, derive from the geographic information systems (GIS) processing of digitized nineteenthcentury railroad maps and related sources as described below.
We measure the causal impact of the railroad on improved acreage using a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. is compares the change in farm outcomes between 1850 and 1860 in a treatment group of counties-identi ed as those that gained access to the railroad during the period-versus a control group that did not. We have excluded from consideration those counties that already had rail links in 1850 so that our treatment group consists of counties that gained rail access during the 1850s versus those counties that did not have access until a er 1860. Our analysis is complicated by the fact that some counties' boundaries were redrawn during the period, while others did not even exist until the 1840s. Consequently, we have also restricted our analysis to the 278 counties in the Midwest that already existed in 1840 and did not e difference in differences approach was largely pioneered by David Card (see Card and Krueger 1994) and is now widely used (see, for example, the mini courses given by Wooldridge (2007) to various organizations including the NBER, and Angrist and Pischke 2009). For criticisms of the methodology, see, for example, the special issue of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, especially Meyer (1995). change their boundaries during the 1850s. e location of these counties is shown in Figure 1 .
We have supplemented our analysis of the share of improved farm land with two robustness checks. First, because improved land was more valuable than unimproved land, we expect to nd increases in the value of farm acreage associated with the coming of the railroad. We measure this as the average value of an hectare of land in farms in the county using census estimates of the "value of farms." is value includes the value of the land as well as improvements and structures, and our results con rm that the coming of the railroad did, indeed, have a treatment effect on farm values. Moreover, when we repeat this DID analysis of farm values but control for the percentage of land that was improved, we are only able to explain some of the increase in farm values, suggesting that the railroad's effects on land value were general-that is a pure location effect.
A second robustness check addresses a key assumption in our DID analysis: that (conditional on various observable determinants), the coming of the railroad to a county was a random event. If this assumption were false, the estimated treatment effect of the railroad on farm improvements would be biased. In particular, if county residents anticipated getting a railroad it would make economic sense to "build-inadvance"-that is, to improve acreage in advance of the railroad. If this were the case, then our DID treatment effect would be biased downwards and our estimates would undervalue the effect of the railroad.
To address this possible bias, we compare our DID results with results of an analysis in which an instrument variable (IV) was used. is instrument is derived from various federal government transportation surveys conducted in the 1820s and early 1830s-that is to say, right at the start of the railroad age and well in advance of when we observe the possible effects of the railroad on these Midwestern counties. ese results are consistent with our initial DID ndings that the coming of the railroad had a relatively large effect, such that it accounted for at least a quarter of the increased fraction of improved land; this nding suggests that our DID estimates of the impact of the railroad may indeed be biased downwards.
is restriction does not substantively change the results but it makes our analysis cleaner.
is, for example, is a key insight in the work of Levinson (2008) and Xie and Levinson (2010) .
e impact of access to rail transportation on agricultural impro ement  2 Nineteenth-century land clearing While the rst step to becoming a farmer was to acquire title to land, either through private purchase or directly from the federal government under the terms of the prevailing land legislation, the cost of purchasing raw land was generally minor compared with the cost of clearing it and readying it for cultivation. For example, according to contemporary estimates by Seaman (1852, 484, 656) , imply the cost of clearing and fencing land averaged between about $27 (in 1850) and $30 (in 1840 when more of the land was wooded) per hectare, while Lebergott's data (Lebergott 1985, Table 3 ) suggest the median cost of improving a hectare of land in the Midwest was between about $34 and $62 in 1850. In contrast, the average price of raw land bought using military land warrants was less than a dollar per acre, or somewhat more than $2 per hectare (Swierenga 1968, Table 6.1; Oberly 1990) . ese cost differentials re ect the fact that where the land was forested, trees had to be cut down and burned or hauled away. Even then, the more laborious and labor intensive task of stump removal remained. In areas where the land was naturally clear of trees, as on the Midwestern prairies, clearing expenses remained high as heavy, specialized equipment and crews were needed to break the prairie sod (Stellingwerff and Swierenga 2004) . Even when the land had been cleared, it still had to be fenced to keep livestock in and predators out. Many of these activities were expensive, arduous, and time-consuming even when they could be done by the farmer and the family using only those tools and implements that came readily to hand on a nineteenth-century farm. As a result, farmers rarely cleared all the land they needed or wanted at once. According to Primack (1962 Primack ( , 1977 , farmers could only clear two to four hectares a year. us, clearing the approximately 525 000 hectares of land (much of it forested) that was cleared annually in the Midwest in the 1850s must have occupied the time of about one-sixth of the Midwestern labor force at the time. Needless to say, with this kind of investment in cash and time, cleared land was highly valuable compared with virgin stock and accounted for much of the resale price of farm land.
The impact of transportation improvements on land values
e economic logic linking transportation costs to land improvements can be illustrated using a von ünen model of agricultural land rents rst proposed in 1826 (von ünen and Hall 1966) . To x ideas, suppose that each farmer has a farm of size one hectare (of improved land), located at distance t from a "central place" where trade with the hinterland (i.e., the farmer) takes place. e farm supplies labor z at an opportunity cost of w. e cost of transporting output q per unit of distance is c and the price of output (at the central place) is p.
In a competitive market these assumptions imply that the rental price R(t ) of a farm at distance t from the central place is
Note that if t = 0 the farm is located on the boundary of the central place and R(t ) is at a maximum as determined by the yield of the land (q) given the labor input (z), output price, and the opportunity cost of the farmer's time. Conversely, there will exist a t * that de nes the distance from the central place beyond which it is not pro table to farm,
Economists sometimes refer to this as the extensive margin for market production.
It is straightforward to show that
; that is to say, a reduction in transport costs " attens" the relationship between land rents and distance to the central place and, therefore, increases the distance t * from the central place at which farming is still just pro table. A fall in transport costs therefore makes it economical to bring more land into production. However, before this land can be brought into production it has to be improved-that is, cleared and fenced-hence the link between transport costs and land improvements.
Of course, other factors also determine t * and therefore affect the amount of land in production. A rise in p, for example, or a reduction in w, will also increase t * . Moreover, in an explicitly dynamic setup, the permanent versus transitory nature of changes in these parameters will in uence the likelihood of improving land and bringing it into production, as will expectations about future values. Railroad building was (in general) a permanent change in the environment, and thus could be expected to generate a greater response in land improvements than, for example, a shi in output prices, which might prove to be transitory. One reason for this was that much of the railroad investment was not only xed but also "sunk, " in that it was embedded in location-speci c improvements. A railroad, once built, could not be relocated easily, and the bene t of that investment could only be fully captured by another transportation medium-investments in grading, lling, and cuttings, for example. According to the 1880 Census (United States Census Office et al. 1991) , over 80 percent of railroad investment went into construction costs, of which only one or two percent represented the cost of the land itself; the rest was spent on surveying, grading, removing or bridging        . obstacles, and laying the track. While the railroad ties, ballast, and rails might be reused elsewhere and the land itself could be resold, the grading, cuttings, embankments, bridges, and drainage ditches had few alternative uses other than serving the needs of a transportation system-especially in the nineteenth century.⁴ Indeed, railroads (and interstate highways) today still follow many of the routes blazed by the nineteenthcentury railroads.⁵ If there were any adjustment costs involved in making improvements to their land-as would seem likely-then it would be rational for farmers to improve some land in advance of construction if they anticipated receiving rail access in the near term-that is, farmers are expected to be forwardlooking rather than merely reactive.⁶ We will return to this point later in our instrumental variable analysis, as it relates to a possible downward bias in our difference-in-differences estimation.
The data
We use a newly constructed geographic information system (GIS) database on the transportation infrastructure in the mid-nineteenth century Midwestern United States, which we have linked to an updated version of the well-known ICPSR county-level census database.
is GIS-based methodology has several advantages over earlier approaches, which have generally involved matching historical transportation maps to county boundary maps by hand (and eye).⁷ Our GIS database was created from geo-referenced digitized historical maps showing the transportation system-canals, navigable ⁴ Today, of course, they nd recreational uses in the "rails to trails" movement.
⁵ And, of course, thanks to GIS, these can be quite precisely located. One might thus be tempted to begin with modern railroad maps and force the nineteenth century locations to conform to these. On average, this is probably a good strategy even though it would misrepresent earlier track locations that were changed through realignments.
ere are two downsides to this strategy-the potential for copyright infringement since these GIS SHP les are proprietary commercial ventures and the large number of individual segments which comprise the modern rail network. For example, the 177 000 mile rail network from Bureau of Transportation Statistics and distributed ESRI with ArcGIS contains over 131 000 segments. See United States Department of Transportation (1998).
⁶ For a similar point, see, for example, Levinson (2008) . ⁷ See, for example, Craig et al. (1998) who visually compared historical maps to county boundaries (which generally did not appear on the historical maps). For a discussion of the hand-matching procedure used by Craig and the pitfalls that can arise, see footnote #2 of Atack et al. (2010) .
waterways, and railroads-at different benchmark dates.⁸ We have not yet tried to render information on roads and trails. e canal data were taken from Poor (1970) and Goodrich (1961) as well as from digitized maps accessed via the Library of Congress "American Memory" web site, including the maps prepared by Williams (1851) and Disturnell (Burr 1850) . Information on navigable rivers was taken from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers GIS data (Vanderbilt University Engineering Center for Transportation Operations and Research 1999), supplemented by information from Hunter (1949) and contemporary newspaper accounts regarding steamboat service on speci c rivers. Since very little change occurred in the canal and river systems from the 1840s until the Corps of Engineers embarked on its ambitious navigation plans beginning with the establishment of the Office of Western River Improvements in 1866, we have measured access to water-borne transportation as of a single benchmark date (1850) rather than by change over time.
e railroad portion of our GIS database is based on digitized state-level maps for 1911 from e Century Atlas (Whitney and Smith 1911) since these maps appear to be accurately drawn and the rail network was largely completed by that time but had not yet begun to shrink through closures.⁹ is 1911 railroad network was then traced back through time to earlier dates using digitized transportation maps from the Library of Congress and other sources such as the maps created by Taylor and Neu (1956) . Our implicit assumption in this approach is that most railroad investment was literally sunk in locationspeci c grading and other immoveable features, a presumption that is strongly supported by the available data.
⁸ Geo-referencing refers to the process of xing speci c points with known geographic coordinates between the digitized image-which was invariably drawn and printed with error (and which may also be subject to parallax error as a result of the digitization process)-and the geographically accurately rendered base boundary les (a "shape le" in ESRI's parlance). Algorithms within the GIS so ware then distribute the error (the difference) between the historical images and the boundary le across the space between xed points. In essence, the process treats the historical image as if it were printed on a sheet of rubber which is then stretched over the boundary le with pins holding it in place at xed reference points between the two. Once done, it is then possible to "trace" features from the historical image onto the geographically coordinated boundary le. e resulting les can then be manipulated and used for computations using the GIS soware. Accurate historical county boundary les are freely available from the National Historical Geographical Information System at the University of Minnesota (http://www.nhgis.org/) along with a wide variety of historical United States census data.
⁹ ese digitized images were purchased from Goldbug.com but the original source may be found in many libraries around the country, including Vanderbilt's.
e impact of access to rail transportation on agricultural impro ement  For the Midwest, which is our focus here, we have supplemented these more general sources with detailed information for the seven states in the region. Especially detailed information about the spreading rail network in ve of these states (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin) exists in the form of a series of crudely drawn maps and a data appendix prepared more than ninety years ago at the University of Wisconsin by Professor Frederick L. Paxson (Paxson 1914) and his students, who used extant contemporary travel guides published between 1848 and 1860 as their principal sources of information. ⁰ Since then, however, many of these travel guides (which were cheaply printed ephemera) seem to have been lost or to have disintegrated. is is unfortunate, as there is little doubt that they are, or rather would have been, the single most valuable resource for our research.
ese guides served the needs of the traveling public, providing up-to-date route maps and timetables. Consequently, they were published at fairly frequent and regular intervals by a number of different companies and, presumably, competition among them should have guaranteed that only the best (that is, the most accurate, complete and useful) would have continued publication for an extended period of time. Our data for Iowa and Missouri are taken from digitized contemporary state maps from the online David Rumsey Map Collection (http://www.davidrumsey.com/) for 1856 (Colton 1856a,b) , 1857 (Colton 1857 ) and 1859 (Mitchell 1859a,b) supplemented by national maps from the Library of Congress collection for 1858 (Sage 1858 ) and 1860 (Colton 1860 . Some of these were published monthly; others, semi-annually or annually. Each typically went through many editions. All of the guides that we have physically handled are fragile, especially the multi-page fold-out maps, and not sturdy enough for scanning or copying, although a few guides have been digitized and are available on-line. See, for example, the June 1870 copy of the Travelers' Official Railway Guide at http://cprr.org/Museum/Books/I_ACCEPT_the_ User_Agreement/Travellers_Guide_6-1870.pdf from the Central Paci c Railroad Museum.
ere are also at least two different editions of Appleton's Guide on Google Books such as http://books.google.com/books? vid=UOM39015016751375 as well as a number of other guides. See http: //www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/map_sites/hist_guide_sites.html.
However, as we note below, these sources do not seem to have been infallible-certainly at any moment of time. a value of 1 if a railroad crossed or formed a county's border. Our choice of this measure re ects the still-preliminary nature of our GIS database. While we are certain that it can create the binary "0-1" access variable accurately, we are not yet convinced that the original maps and our "tracings" of them are sufficiently precise to generate more re ned measures of access, such as the miles of track in the county. Another measure of "access"-proximity to a railroad stations or depots-can only be measured beginning in the mid-1850s when maps begin to record this important information. For example, the earliest digitized map in the Library of Congress collection to mention stations and depots explicitly dates from 1856 (Ensign, Bridgman & Fanning 1856). Paradoxically, it shows many more named places along the right of way than the map from Dinsmore's travel guide for same year, which might have been expected to show prospective travelers their station destinations. Nor does it appear that the Ensign, Bridgman and Fanning map was overly sanguine in its reporting of railroad stations. Another map published two years later (Sage 1858) shows most of the same stations as Ensign, Bridgman and Fanning plus additional ones along the new rights of way as well as a few others scattered between some of the 1856 stations and depots. Beginning in the 1870s, Rand-McNally (Morgan 1969 ) and other publishers began to produce "commercial" maps for the convenience of shippers, showing destinations to which freight could be consigned; these maps made the reporting of depots and stations more reliable and systematic. As a practical matter, however, trains could potentially stop and load almost anywhere (albeit inconveniently)-much as they do in parts of Alaska even today-and stations were built only when freight and passenger volume had passed some critical economic threshold.
Despite our measure of access to transportation being crude and limited, it is still the best current measure of the historical spread of the United States railroad system at the county level for this period. ese transportation access data have then been linked with the county-level Haines-ICPSR census data using county FIPS codes, which are common to both One obvious problem is that the access variable does not capture within-county variation in access and counties differed in size. In our econometric analysis we weight by county land area but we are unable at the present time to adjust for cases in which the railroad lay close to a county boundary but where the adjacent counties do not have rail access. County boundaries, in other words, are arbitrary ways of delineating local economies; the average farmer in a geographically small county in our control group that happened to be adjacent to a large county in the treatment group might have had better access to the railroad than the average person in the large county. If this were common it would produce a downward bias in our estimated treatment effects. Although we do not believe this bias to be important empirically we admit that the question is open.        . databases. In 1840, the seven states and territorial areas in our study had 391 "counties" (these include, for example, Clayton "county" in the Iowa Territory, which then comprised most of what we now know as the state of Minnesota) ( orndale and Dollarhide 1987). By 1860, however, all of the area under consideration had been organized into states and was divided into 623 counties. Because of boundary changes, we have restricted our analysis to those counties that were: (1) present beginning in 1840; (2) had the same county boundaries (as determined by square mileage in 1850 and 1860); and (3) did not have rail access as of 1850. Taken together, these restrictions produce a balanced panel of 278 Midwestern counties.
e distribution of these counties is shown in Table 1 , and their locations are mapped in Figure 1 . ualitatively, our results are unchanged if we relax the requirement that boundaries remain unchanged.
We have divided this panel into a treatment group and a control group. e treatment group consists of those counties that did not have rail access in 1850 but gained it at some point between 1850 and 1860. e control group is the set of counties that did not have rail access in either 1850 or 1860. e 1840 data for these same counties then allows us to control for pre-1850s trends in certain variables in our analysis (see below).
By construction, none of the counties in our sample had rail access in 1850. By 1860, however, 195 of the 278 counties, representing almost 72 percent of the land area in the panel, had gained direct access to at least one railroad (See Table 2 and Figure 2 ). e share of farm land that was improved rose by 13 percentage points between 1850 and 1860 across all counties in the panel, while the logarithm of perhectare value of farms, which we use in our robustness checks (see below), increased by 0.796 log points or 123 percent (= exp[0.796] − 1) × 100). Table 2 also shows the sample averages for percent improved and the logarithm of farm values per hectare conditional on their treatment status. In the treatment counties, the percentage of land that was improved rose by 15.6 percentage points from 1850 to 1860 or almost double the 8.4 percentage By "balanced" we mean that the same counties appear in 1850 and 1860; no new counties enter the sample during the 1850s. Balancing ensures that county xed effects are "differenced away" when we compute the change in economic outcomes from 1850 to 1860; this would not be the case if new counties entered the sample in the 1850s. We restrict our basic analysis to counties with xed land area because the ICPSR census data are not adjusted for changes in land area over time. Results are qualitatively the same if we do not impose the restriction that the county not have rail access by 1850 and if we do not impose the requirement that county boundaries be the same in 1850 and 1860. point increase in the control counties. e difference between these-7.2 percentage points-is the difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect of gaining rail access with no other control variables in the regression (see below). is is equal to 18 percent of the mean proportion of land that was improved in 1850. As such, the effect is economically large.
e equivalent difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect of rail access on per-acre farm values is 0.072, or about 7.5 percent. Both estimates are statistically signi cant at the ve-percent level.
In an ideal difference-in-differences analysis, the treatment and control counties would be sufficiently "similar" or "matched" that treatment could be (plausibly) argued to be randomly assigned. However, it is immediately evident from Table 2 that this was not the case with rail access. Counties that gained rail access in the 1850s already had a greater fraction of their farmland improved and this was also more valuable land by 1850-that is, before gaining rail access.
e observations that the treatment counties already had more of their farm acreage improved and more valuable farms (in part, because the land was more improved, see below) are manifestations of the same general issue: railroads did not arrive randomly. In particular, railroad promoters and investors in the Midwest paid close attention to agricultural development because the pro tability of the railroad depended upon it (Fishlow 1965; Gates 1934) .
is is illustrated in Table 3 , which shows the correlates, agricultural and otherwise, of gaining rail access in the 1850s using a simple linear probability model. In column 1 of Table 3, e Midwestern railroad network at benchmark dates relative to our panel of counties with stable boundaries. just three covariates: the logarithm of the value of agricultural output per hectare (a measure of the land's "yield, " in this case its revenue productivity); the percentage of total agricultural output in 1840 represented by wheat production; and the change in the wheat output percentage between 1840 and 1850. ⁴ Wheat is a crop of particular importance at this time as it was the primary "cash crop" of the period and, therefore, likely a key determinant of whether a rail line would be profitable. Each of these variables had a positive and signi cant effect on the likelihood of gaining rail access; for example, a 10 ⁴ e 1840 census reports the value of wheat production and the total value of agricultural output. For 1850 we use an estimate of the value of total agricultural output based on national prices multiplied by quantities; the wheat share is therefore the wheat output (in bushels) multiplied by wheat price divided by the estimated value of agricultural output. It is possible that our procedure for estimating agricultural values may overstate the growth in the percentage of wheat over the 1840s (because 1840 output was probably valued at local prices) but any such bias should be mitigated once we control for state xed effects (since state-level variation arguably captures the most salient price variation). Our agricultural yield variable also uses the estimated value of agricultural output in its construction (the numerator).
percentage point increase in the wheat share boosts the probability of gaining rail access by 5.3 percentage points.
However, the signi cant positive coefficients on the agricultural variables may also be due to other factors that are omitted from the regression. For example, an earlier paper (Atack et al. 2010) examined the relationship between gaining rail access and measures of urbanization, population density and our water transportation dummies using the same panel. Accordingly, in column 2 of Table 3 we have included measures of urbanization and population density in 1840 as well as changes in these variables between 1840 and 1850. We have also included dummy variables for access to different modes of water transportation (river, canals, and abutting the Great Lakes) while in column 3 we have also included dummy variables for each state. Adding additional controls reduces the magnitudes of the coefficients of the agricultural variables but the coefficients on the wheat "yield" variable and the "pretrend" (1840-50) in the wheat share remain statistically signi cant. Moreover (not shown) several of these control variables are themselves statistically signi cant; for example, the e impact of access to rail transportation on agricultural impro ement presence of a canal was positively associated with gaining rail access, whereas having a navigable river reduced the statistical likelihood of gaining rail access. Because gaining rail access clearly was not a random event, it is important, at the very least, that we control for the factors shown in Table 3 in our difference-in-differences analysis as they may have had independent effects on the change in percentage of improved acreage between 1850 and 1860. Column 1 of Table 4 reports our base DID estimate (that is, absent any controls for the other correlates of rail access) for the percentage of total farm acres that were improved. is is the same as the gure reported in Table 2 . In column 2, we report the DID estimate of the treatment effect, taken from a regression in which we have included interactions between the full set of control variables in Table 3 and the dummy variable for the 1860 census year. Including these control variables reduces the DID treatment effect from 0.072 (base estimate) to 0.048, or 4.8 percentage points. However, although the addition of controls reduces the impact of getting rail access, the treatment effect remains signi cantly positive: counties that gained rail access in the 1850s increased improved acreage to a signi cantly greater extent than counties that remained without rail access before the Civil War even a er controlling for other factors.

We have made two robustness checks on this nding. First, we estimate the treatment effect of gaining rail access on the Rail Access = 1 0.072* (0.015) 0.048* (0.015) e unit of observation is the county. e dependent variable is the percentage of farm area in the county that was improved as reported in the census of agriculture. e coefficient of Rail Access = 1 is the coefficient of a dummy variable for the treatment counties (Treatment = 1) interacted with a dummy variable for the year 1860. In column 1, there are no control variables other than xed effects for counties and Year = 1860. In column 2, the regression also includes interaction terms between the control variables in Table 3, column 3 (see the notes to Table 3 ) and Year = 1860. Prior to estimation, observations are weighted by surface area of the county. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
*: signi cant at the ve percent level.        . logarithm of the value of farms per hectare of farmland. If the logic underlying the von ünen model is correct, then the impact of gaining rail access should also be re ected in higher farm values per hectare. We have already shown that this was the case with the simple DID calculations in Table 2 , but those estimates do not control for additional factors associated with gaining rail access. Moreover, the size of the treatment effect should be smaller still if we also control for the change in the percent improved (since improved land itself was more valuable)-again, something that is not re ected in the DID estimate in Table 2 . Table 5 shows the difference-in-differences estimates for farm values. In contrast to the results for improved farmland, the effect of gaining rail access is larger once we add the additional controls. Note that, when we also add the change in the percentage of improved area to the regression, the treatment effect is reduced in size (as the von ünen framework would predict), but controlling for the percentage improved does not eliminate the effect of gaining rail access on land values. is suggests that transportation improvements raised the value of unimproved land as well. is, of course, generally should be the case since most unimproved land has an option value-the farmer could always choose to improve it in the future.
Our second check on the robustness of our results is made using an instrumental variable. Although we can control for the various correlates in Table 3 in our DID analysis, it is still possible that the analysis is invalid because the treatment-gaining rail access-is correlated with the error term even a er controlling for observable determinants of gaining rail access. is problem is of particular concern here because the 1840 census reported no acreage statistics making it impossible for us to control for the pre-1850 trend in the percentage of land that was improved.
is will likely bias the treatment effect towards zero.
To understand why this is so, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that farmers in a county anticipated gaining rail access in the near future-a reasonable supposition for Midwestern farmers at the start of the 1850s. ⁵ If ⁵ For example, based on new rail construction in 1848 and 1849, farmers in ve counties in the balanced panel (Boone, Dearborn and Washington Counties in Indiana, Genesee County in Michigan and Henry County in Ohio) might reasonably have expected that they too would have a railroad in their county within a year or so. In fact, if a dummy variable (ANTICI-PATE = 1) is included in the rail access regression in Table 3 , the coefficient is positive (β = 0.314), indicating that such counties did gain rail access in the 1850s. However, the standard error of the coefficient is relatively large (s.e. = 0.195); more importantly, including this additional dummy variable has virtually no effect on the other coefficients in Table 3 . Further, if AN-TICIPATE is included in the DID speci cations (Table 4 or Table 5 , full set of controls) the estimated treatment effects of rail access are unchanged. the costs of improving farmland were increasing at the margin which was almost certainly the case since the most readily improvable land would be improved rst, it would make economic sense to incur some of the costs prior to gaining rail access. If this were the case, counties that gained rail access in the 1850s would have experienced above-average growth in improved farmland somewhat earlier, and this would be re ected in a higher average percentage of improved land in 1850-as we observed was the case (recall Table 2 ). Conversely, some of the control counties might have anticipated (correctly, as it happens) that they would only gain rail access a er 1860. By this same logic, they would have experienced above-average growth in improved land in the 1850s. e bias can be "corrected" to the extent that our control variables capture this process, but we cannot be sure we have captured all of it. Consequently, the percentage of improved land will grow too slowly in the treatment counties in the 1850s and too fast in the control counties, causing the DID estimate of the treatment effect to be biased downwards.
e appropriate correction for this sort of bias is to estimate the relationship using an instrumental variable-a variable that predicts gaining rail access in the 1850s when we control for other factors but which is otherwise uncorrelated with the outcomes we are examining. Using a variable which isolates plausibly exogenous variation in rail access, as we propose here, is similar to what would have been the case if rail access had been randomly assigned. We then predict rail access in 1860 using the instrumental variable and examine the effect of that predicted access on the percentage of land that was improved in 1860.
e historical narrative of internal improvements in America, particularly that for canal construction, assigns an important role to government in promoting these advances (Goodrich 1961) . One such important source of government assistance was the assignment of the Army Corps of Engineers to conduct surveys for potential transportation routes. Beginning in 1824, the President was granted authority to survey routes for "such roads and canals as he may deem of national importance, in a commercial or military point of view, or necessary for the transportation of the public mail" (United States Congress 1824). Although railroads were not mentioned in the original act (hardly surprising since it predates even the Stockton to Darlington Railway in England, the rst steam railroad in the world), it was not long before surveys conducted under this legislation also considered them. For examPresumably this is because the number of counties ( ve) is so small in the 1840s, most of the rail construction was taking place much further east.
e impact of access to rail transportation on agricultural impro ement  Tables 3 and 4 for controls in columns 2 and 3. All regressions include xed effects for counties and year = 1860. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
*: signi cant at the ve percent level.
ple, in 1825 a survey to "ascertain the practicability of uniting the headwaters of the Kenawha [sic] with the James river and Roanoke river" expressly mentions railroads. Railroad routes soon came to dominate the surveys with perhaps as many as 61 such surveys being made before the law was repealed by Andrew Jackson's administration effective in 1838 (Haney 1908, 277) .
Our instrumental variable is derived from the government surveys reported in American State Papers and compiled by Haney (Haney 1908, 283) . For each survey, we have identi ed the counties at the start and endpoint of the proposed line. For example, an 1831 railway survey plotted a route from Portage Summit on the Ohio Canal (near Akron) to the Hudson River (we used Albany as the terminus as the city was not otherwise speci ed) (Haney 1908, 286) . In some cases we inferred both endpoints, as in the case of an 1832 survey for a route between "the Mad River and Lake Erie" in Ohio (Haney 1908, 286) . We used Spring eld and Sandusky as the termini of this projected railroad. Having identi ed the starting and ending counties, we then drew a straight line between the center of the "start" and "end" counties. Counties that lay along this straight line received a value of one, while those that did not were coded as zero.
at is, if a railroad were built, our instrument presumes that it would be built in a straight line as the shortest distance between the two points. ⁶ ese U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' surveys provided valuable information to the general public and prospective railroad promoters alike regarding topography and other factors that would affect potential construction costs. Since the ⁶ Our use of a "straight-line" instrument is inspired in part by Banerjee et al. (2006) who construct a similar instrument for their study of the impact of rail access on wages in modern Chinas. Or course, many topographic features other than the shortest-distance criterion-grade, hills or mountains, and so on-in uenced railroad building, but these topographic features likely affected density and urbanization directly, and thus are not candidates for instrumental variables (they fail the exclusion restriction).
costs of these surveys were borne by the public purse, their existence should have raised the likelihood that a railroad would eventually be built by lowering its private costs. Indeed, George Rogers Taylor (Taylor 1951, 95) even argued that "[a]s trained engineers were still very scarce…the government rendered a uniquely valuable service by making its experts available for such surveys." Moreover, as Haney (Haney 1908, 284) observed, "it is of some signi cance that in most cases the routes of these government surveys were early taken by railways…in the great majority of cases these early surveys have been closely followed" [emphasis added]. Indeed, many of the interstate highways today follow these same routes. Presumably, therefore, the surveys were found to be very useful and so it would seem that our "Congressional Survey" instrument should be well suited to predicting whether or not a county gained rail access. Table 6 reports our estimates using this instrumental variable. e Congressional Survey instrument does quite well in predicting treatment (gaining rail access in the 1850s) even when we control for all of the other variables included in the DID analysis (this is the " rst stage" coefficient shown). We then use this rst stage regression to predict the probability of gaining rail access, and use the predicted values of treatment in the second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression of 1860 outcomes. e 2SLS coefficient is positive and much larger than our DID estimate (0.192 versus 0.048). e difference between the two is also statistically signi cant at the six percent level. e much larger IV coefficient strongly suggests that the anticipatory logic described earlier was present, leading to a downward bias in the estimated treatment effect of gaining rail access on improved acreage.        . Yes Yes e rst stage shows the coefficient of the Congressional Survey instrumental variable from a linear probability regression of rail access. Controls are the same as in column 3 of Table 3 . e second stage shows the coefficient of the predicted value of rail access from a regression of percent improved using the 1860 observations from the panel; control variables are the same as in column 1, above.
IV -DID = 0: signi cance level of a test of the difference between the second stage coefficient (0.192) and the DID coefficient from Table 4 , column 2 (0.048).
Concluding remarks
We have used a novel data set on the antebellum transportation networks in the Midwest, derived from applying GIS so ware to digitized historical maps, to estimate the impact of gaining rail access on investments in improving land for agricultural activity. Such investment during the nineteenth century was a major component of United States capital formation at the time. Counties that gained early access to the railroad-in our case, prior to 1860 rather than later-experienced signi cantly greater increases in the percentage of farm acres that were improved. ese counties also experienced above average increases in the value of their farms.
is was due in part to the rise in the share of improved farmland, but it also re ected the fact farm land in general was more valuable because of its higher revenue product and locational advantage with the advent of the railroad.
We can use the estimated treatment effects to gauge the overall explanatory power of the railroad as a factor behind these agricultural improvements. Using the difference-indifferences estimate (0.048, Table 3 , column 4), the predicted change in percentage of improved farmland between 1850 and 1860 due to gains in rail access is 0.034, or 3.4 percentage points (0.048 × 0.717 = 0.034). is predicted increase is 25 percent (0.034/0.136 = 0.25) of the increase in the percentage of improved land over the 1850s. If, however, we were to use the much larger IV coefficient (0.192), the predicted increase in percentage of improved farmland is correspondingly larger: 0.138. Taken at face value, this would imply that the coming of the railroad accounts for all of the increase in percentage of improved farmland over the decade-indeed, that expansion would have been even more rapid but for some (unidenti ed) retarding factors. Although the IV coefficient is almost signi cantly different from the DID coefficient at conventional signi cance levels, it is not signi cantly different from, say, the average of the DID and IV coefficients. If we use this average ([0.048 + 0.192 ]/2), 0.12, then we can attribute slightly more than two-thirds (68 percent = [0.12 × 0.771]/0.136) of the growth in improved farmland to the spread of the railroad.
In short, whatever else might have led Midwestern farmers to undertake the back-breaking labor of clearing their land for crops and livestock, it is likely that no other single factor was as important as the potential gains from trade deriving from the coming of the railroad.
